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RADIATION FROM NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS: THE NEED FOR
CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTIVES
MICHAEL

S.

BARAM*

Noisy protests against the construction and operation of nuclear
power plants in the United States have convinced some government
officials that the future ofnuclearenergy may depend more on public
perceptions of dangerthan on capitalcosts, capacityfactors, and safe
nuclear waste disposal. The assumption of some plant operatorsand
regulatory agencies that low-level additions to the radiologicalburdens of life on earthfrom nuclearfacilities will cause "acceptable "
increases in death and genetic mutation certainly does not raise
public confidence. Nuclearpower advocates should be as interested
as environmentalistsin keeping emissions to an absolute minimum.
Yet, as Mr. Baram argues in this Article, the present structure of
radiation control fails to "achieveits goal. He suggests that the
absence of an unquestionedpositionfor the EnvironmentalProtection Agency and the states allows the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to narrow its consideration of radiation exposure to the power
plant effluent alone and loosen standardswhere it deems appropriate. Moreover, the Commission'spre-regulatory cost-benefit balancing test biases its regulations against safety. He concludes that
Congress must permit other agencies to participatein the regulatory
process and must decide for itself what health risks to present and
future generations can be tolerated.
Introduction

Congress often responds to a complex problem by empowering an independent regulatory agency to enforce its legislative
will. Acknowledging its own lack of knowledge and time, Congress gives the agency a measure of freedom to modify the legal
requirements to fit a variety of circumstances that the legisla* B.S., Tufts University, 1957; LL.B., Columbia University, 1960; Former Professor
of Civil Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Member of the staff of the
Franklin Pierce Law Center, Concord, New Hampshire. Member of the firm of Bracken Selig & Baram, Boston, Massachusetts; Member of the Committee on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation, National Academy of Sciences. This article is adapted
from "Legal and Ethical Aspects of Using Cost-Benefit Analysis," a chapter of the 1977
Report of the Committee to the Environmental Protection Agency.
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ture could not foresee. Ordinarily Congress restrains this autonomy by prescribing general criteria that the agency must
consider and objectives that must be met.' These provisions
enable Congress to measure the agency's progress and make
necessary changes in the law. In addition, competition from
other bureaus forces the agency to act vigorously or face a loss
of prestige.
But Congress did not follow its normal practice in enacting
the provisions governing radioactive emissions from nuclear
power plants. Instead, it permitted the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to add protective conditions to power plant
licenses whenever the agency felt that they would be appropriate. 2 Criteria and goals for public exposure to power plant
radiation were left to the agency's planners. Moreover, Congress granted other agencies authority that logically extends to
radioactive discharges, but neither explicitly sanctioned competitive efforts nor provided for interagency cooperation with
the AEC. Congress may have been reluctant to clarify its desires
while the federal government continued to promote nuclear
power in an effort to recoup some of its capital investment in
atomic weapons research and gaseous diffusion plants. Yet the
end of official optimism implicit in the division of the AEC into
research and regulatory branches 3 has not eliminated the uncertainty.
This article explores the consequences of uncontrolled congressional delegation of authority to the AEC's successor, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and recommends ways
of curbing agency discretion that could better guard the public
health from the risks imposed by ionizing radiation. Section I
discusses the potential role of the Environmental Protection
Agency and state agencies in the regulation of radioactive discharges. It criticizes the congressional indecision that led to the
restrictive judicial doctrines of federal and administrative preemption, but suggests that the EPA and the states still retain
I The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975), and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4335 (1970), are examples of recent congressional enactments calling for
agency consideration of multiple and diverse factors in the regulatory process.
2 See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
3 See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
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sufficient authority to adopt standards that complement the
NRC's requirements. Section II questions the usefulness of the
NRC's cost-benefit balancing test that must justify emission
standards before they are imposed. It shows the practical failings of such analyses and advises Congress to reclaim its power
to set standards according to a representative assessment of
acceptable risk. Once Congress makes these social choices, the
NRC can apply cost-effectiveness to select the best method of
meeting the congressional standards.
I.

CHOOSING REGULATORS FOR POWER PLANT RADIATION

Operators of nuclear power plants routinely release significant quantities of ionizing radiation into the environment. 4
Ionizing radiation is similar to other forms of pollution in the
risk it imposes on human health and environmental quality. 5
But it differs from other pollutants in its low susceptibility to
chemical change and purification by the environment itself.
Although radioactive isotopes vary in their rates of decay, their
half-lives are often long and cannot be reduced by natural
reactions. 6 Moreover, isotopes may tend to cumulate in animals
and humans through the food chain, and cumulative exposure
to radiation can produce greater injury.7 Thus long-lived
sources of radiation could continue to cause somatic damage to
individuals long after their initial appearance in the air or
water. Finally, the potential for long-term genetic damage precludes a safe or "threshold" level of exposure." Control of
4 One estimate suggests that the 100 nuclear reactors projected for operation by
1985 will add 0.5 millirem per year to the average radiation dose of the entire United
States population. See E. HALL, RADIATION AND LIFE 192 (1976).
5 For a detailed discussion of the known health and environmental effects of radiation, see M. EISENBUD, ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOACTIVITY 1-204 (2d ed. 1973); PRINCIPLES
OF RADIATION PROTECTION 266-496 (K. Morgan & J. Turner, eds. 1967). See also W.
PATTERSON, NUCLEAR POWER 280-85 (1976).
6 See M. EiSENBUD, supra note 5, at 10-11, 58.
7 Id. at 118-36. Some isotopes, such as iodine-131, may also concentrate in certain
organs of the human body, where their ordinary chemical constituents are metabolized
and do disproportionate damage. W. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 142.
8 W. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 281. See A. TAMPLIN & J. GOFMAN, 'POPULATION
CONTROL' THROUGH NUCLEAR POLLUTION 2-27 (1970). The Environmental Protection
Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission have adopted this position for regulatory
purposes. See U.S. Envt'l Protection Agency, Policy Statement: Relationship Between
Radiation Dose and Effect (March 3, 1975); U.S. Atom. Energy Commission, Concluding Statement of Position of Regulatory Staff: Public Rulemaking Hearing on Numeri-
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radioactive emissions at the power plant site would appear to be
necessary to minimize human exposure to radiation.
At the same time, however, some consideration must be given
to ambient levels of ionizing radiation in the environment to
distribute the primary health risks of radiation among all members of society. Natural sources expose individuals to low levels
of radiation that vary according to geographical location and
population density.9 Moreover, scientists have some ability to
predict dispersion patterns for radioactive isotopes released
into the atmosphere or watercourses.10 Man-made sources of
radiation might therefore be distributed to equalize human
exposure to ionizing radiation. Monitoring of ambient levels of
certain isotopes could assist in maintaining radioactivity at
average natural background rates."1
The diverse health effects and unusual environmental flow
patterns of radiation complicate its measurement and control.
But these complexities should not be allowed to mask the fundamental duality of regulations applied to radioactive releases
from nuclear power plants. On the one hand, emission standards can be set to minimize radiation discharges within the
limits of technology or some rule of reasonable expense. These
standards may or may not produce ambient concentrations of
isotopes that take advantage of iatural and artificial variations.
On the other hand, ambient radiation standards can be translated into specific siting and construction criteria for nuclear
power plants. These standards should but might not minimize
random emissions. Therefore, while each approach can generate a set of guidelines for control of nuclear power plant
cal Guidelines for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the
Criterion "As Low As Practicable" for Radioactive Materials in Light-Water-Cooled
Nuclear Power Reactors 36-37 (Docket No. RM-50-2) (Feb. 20, 1974) [hereinafter cited
as Concluding Statement].
9 M. EISENBUD, supra note 5, at 458. Exposure to other artificial sources of radiation
such as medical x-rays and industrial processes can vary widely between urban and
rural areas. See E. HALL, supra note 4, at 154, 179.
10 Id. at 87-158.
11 Id. at 432-56. Radiologists often presume that background radiation is biologically harmless because natural radiation is inescapable and ill-effects are not experimentally discernible. The serious danger of genetic injury, however, suggests that such
a presumption only reflects the inadequacies of our biological knowledge. See W.
PATERSON, supra note 5, at 282. High levels of background radiation do not justify
additional burdens, although equalization of unavoidable burdens may mitigate the
effects of the"compromise.
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radiation, working from opposite directions, a combination of
both methods should best regulate its hazards. Administrators
of radiation controls who have separate jurisdiction over ambient and emission standards should act independently in their
initial drafting of regulations, but should cooperate in the
promulgation of final standards.
Regulation of radioactive discharges from nuclear power
plants was initially within the exclusive province of a single
agency. From 1954 to 1970, authority to control both on-site
and off-site aspects of nuclear power was vested in the AEC.
The statutory grant was broad, giving the agency power to
impose such conditions on licensees as it determined to be in
the public interest. 12 Through its control of the design, construction, and maintenance of nuclear power plants, the AEC
could control the level of radiation both at the plant site and in
the environment.
Pursuant to its authority, the AEC set outer limits on permissible radiation in the environment. In 1970, Congress transferred this authority to set "generally applicable environmental
standards for the protection of the general environment from
radioactive material" to the newly-created Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).' 3 Congress thereby modified the AEC's
12 "Each license shall'be in such form and contain such terms and conditions as the
Commission may, by rule or regulation, prescribe to effectuate the provisions of this
chapter." Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2233 (1970).
13 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-70 comp.), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. at 609 and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970). "There are hereby transferred to the
Administrator (of the EPA): (6) The functions of the Atomic Energy Commission under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, administered through its Division of Radiation Protection Standards, to the extent that such functions of the Commission
consist of establishing generally applicable environmental standards for the
protection of the general environment from radioactive material. As used
herein, standards mean limits on radiation exposures or levels, or concentrations or quantities of radioactive material, in the general environment outside
the boundaries of locations under the control of persons possessing or using
radioactive material.
(7) All functions of the Federal Radiation Council (42 U.S.C. 2021(h)).
5 U.S.C. app., § 2(a)(6)-(7). The Federal Radiation Council was established in 1959 by
executive order and by an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §
202 1(h) (1970). Its function was to advise the President on radiation matters and to give
"guidance" to other federal agencies. The FRC generally followed the recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and the
National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP). These two bodies are private,
quasi-official organizations that depend upon volunteer efforts by distinguished scientists. See W. PATrERSON, supra note 5, at 281.
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power to impose conditions on its licensees in that conditions
affecting off-site radiation levels and exposure henceforth
would have to be consistent with EPA regulations and guidelines. Thus the EPA assumed responsibility for protection of
the public from radiation while the AEC retained authority to
regulate radiation emission levels at the power plant site. In
1974, Congress split the old AEC into the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and Development
Agency (ERDA). The NRC was given almost all of the AEC's
remaining regulatory authority and ERDA was given respon4
sibility for the development of nuclear energy.'
The action of Congress in dividing jurisdiction over on-site
and off-site radiation between the NRC and the EPA 5 may
reflect a belief that the agencies should share responsibility for
making nuclear reactors as safe as possible. Congress' failure to
prohibit states from using their land use powers to govern
power plants also implies a role for state planning boards. This
section will demonstrate, however, that the EPA and the states
have not performed to their potential in protecting the public
health and welfare against ionizing radiation. Misunderstandings about judicial doctrines of preemption have weakened
enthusiasm for action and have established the NRC as the only
credible restraint upon radiation emissions.
A. The Role of the EPA
The transfer of authority over ambient off-site radiation
levels from the AEC to the EPA was part of a general plan to
consolidate environmental control programs of the federal
government, to establish the EPA as the overall coordinator of
pollution control efforts, and to put ".

.

. into one agency a

variety of research, monitoring, standard-setting, and enforcement activities scattered throughout several departments
and agencies. 16 Since the EPA inherited its basic authority
14 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1243 (1974).
15 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
16 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 5 U.S.C. app. at 609.
Our national government today is not structured to make a coordinated
attack on the pollutants which debase the air we breathe, the water we drink,
and the land that grows our food. Indeed the present governmental structure
for dealing with environmental pollution often defies effective and concerted
acton....
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from the Federal Radiation Council and the AEC,17 the agency,
as a matter of course, inherited the discretion and duties that
accompany that authority. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954
required the AEC to set and implement standards for the
siting, design, and operation of nuclear power plants as required by the public interest.1 8 Such a grant of authority indicates that the EPA, as heir to its duty, should now be playing an
important part in carrying out these regulatory tasks.
The EPA also possesses authority under the Clean Air Act,1 9
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 20 and the
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)2 ' that should involve it further in the control of both radiation emissions and ambient
off-site levels of radiation. The SDWA required the EPA to
issue regulations for "contaminants," which have been defined
to include radiological materials. 22 The Clean Air Act requires
the EPA to regulate pollutants that are determined by the
Administrator to be hazardous to public health. 23 Finally, the
FWPCA requires that the EPA regulate the discharge of water
pollutants from point sources, including the discharge of radioactive materials,2 4 establish effluent (emission) standards for
toxic pollutants,2 5 and approve appropriate water quality (ambient) standards to be established by the states.2 6 These statutes
Despite its complexity, for pollution control purposes the environment must
be presented as a single, interrelated system. Present assignments of departmental responsibilities do not reflect this interrelatedness....
In organizational terms, this requires pulling together into one agency a
variety of research, monitoring, standard-setting and enforcement activities
now scattered through several departments and agencies.
As no disjointed array of separate programs can, the EPA would be able in concert with the States- to set and enforce standards for air and water
quality and for individual pollutants. This consolidation of pollution control
authorities would help assure that we do not create new environmental problems in the process of controlling existing ones. Industries seeking to minimize
the adverse impact of their activities on the environment would be assured of
consistent standards covering the full range of waste disposal problems.
Id. at 612.
17 Id.
18
19
20
21

42
42
33
42

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§
§
§
§

2012(e) (1970).
1857c-7 (Supp. V 1975).
1362 (Supp. V 1975).
300f(6) (Supp. V 1975).

22 42 U.S.C. § 300f-j (Supp. V 1975).
23 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7 (Supp. V 1975).
24 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (Supp. V 1975).

25 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp. V 1975).
26 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1975).
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impose specific duties on the EPA in that they require it to take
positive action on certain pollutants, provide explicit criteria for
agency use in regulation, impose time limits for compliance,
and provide for citizen suits and judicial review of agency
actions. As a result, the laws limit the EPA's discretion even
more closely than does the transferred responsibility from the
AEC.
Finally, the EPA possesses special statutory authority to review the proposals of nuclear power plant construction and
operating license applicants. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 27 and the Guidelines of the U.S. Council on
Environmental Quality 28 provide that the EPA and other agen-

cies with jurisdiction or special expertise review environmental
impact statements (EIS), including those prepared by the NRC
at the construction and operating permit stages of power plant
approval. Also Section 309 of the Clean Air Act requires the
EPA to review the actions of other federal agencies, as embodied in their EIS's, from the perspectives of public health
and environmental quality and to report any problems to the
Council on Environmental Quality. 29 These laws provide adequate authority for EPA review and comment on the siting,
design, and future operations of a nuclear power facility.
Thus a number of statutes appear to direct the EPA to
develop strict standards for ambient radiation levels in the
environment and to review nuclear power plant siting, construction, and operation. But the record of past EPA actions
indicates that it has yet to pursue its legislative mandate vigorously. First, the EPA has abdicated its responsibility for strict
protective ambient radiation standards to the NRC. The NRC
has taken the lead in formulating emission control requirements for nuclear power plant licensees according to its
ALARA cost-benefit test. 30 These requirements have seldom

been applied to siting review and may result in an ambient
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335 (1970). Section 4322(2)(C) requires that the agency
preparing an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) "shall consult with and obtain the
comments of any Federal Agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with
respect to any environmental impact involved."
28 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 (1973) (Guidelines on Environmental Impact Statements
from the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality).
29 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-7 (1970).
30 See notes 86-92 infra and accompanying text.
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concentration of radioactive isotopes that poses serious genetic
and ecological risks. 31 Yet the response of the EPA has not
challenged the NRC in any significant way.3 2 The EPA has

introduced a "dose commitment" concept 33 and has issued general guidelines for the regulation of the uranium fuel cycle, 34

31 See text accompanying notes 56-57 infra.
32 Responsibility for this misallocation of regulatory functions rests, to some extent,
with the Office of Management and Budget and with President Nixon. A memorandum from OMB Director Roy L Ash to the EPA Administrator, Russell Train, of
December 7, 1973, contains a preemptory directive that the EPA accepted:
[T]his memorandum is to advise you that the decision is that AEC should
proceed with its plans for issuing uranium fuel cycle standards, taking into
account the comments received from all sources, including EPA; that EPA
should discontinue its preparations for issuing, now or in the future, any
standards for types of facilities; and that EPA should continue, under its
current authority, to have responsibility for setting standards for the total
amount of radiation in the general environment from all facilities combined in
the uranium fuel cycle, i.e. an ambient standard which would have to reflect
AEC's findings as to the practicability of emission controls....
EPA was thereby ordered to limit its activities to the setting of general environmental
standards and to set such standards in conformance with AEC decisions about the
economic and technical feasibility of available source control measures.
33 The "radiation dose commitment" concept
...
is the sum of all doses to individuals over the entire time period the
(radioactive) material persists in the environment in a state available for
interaction with humans. The unit of measure for this total population dose is
the person-reins delivered in each of the years following release to the environment until the material has been reduced to innocuous levels by either
radioactive decay or removal from the biosphere by other means.
The concept is an important one, but it has yet to be accepted or even publicly
acknowledged by source control authorities. As the EPA has noted:
Since control must be instituted long before the impacts associated with these
releases occur, projection of anticipated potential health effects which could
result from the release of these radio-nuclides constitutes a necessary basis
for decisions concerning the need for institution of control over their release.
Future decisions ought to consider these dose commitments with respect to
both the types of development that should occur and the choice of controls
that should be imposed.
U.S. OFFICE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL
RADIATION DOSE COMMITMENT: AN APPLICATION TO THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY 3,

5 (Feb. 1974).
34 Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Operations, 42 Fed. Reg. 2,858 (1977)
(to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 190). Public response has varied on the proposed
standards. See, e.g., Statement of Roger Mattson, Director of the Division of Siting,
Health, and Safeguards Standards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (March 8,
1976); Comments of the Natural Resources Defense Council (Sept. 15, 1975).
This sluggish regulatory posture is a sharp contrast to the EPA's regulation of other
toxic and hazardous pollutants under the Clear Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970), and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376
(Supp. V 1975), which provide explicit pollution control objectives, means for achieving
those objectives, and enforcement responsibilities. These laws also provide the criteria
to be used in EPA decisions on permissible discharge levels of air and water pollutants.
Most significantly, limitations on the level of pollutants are required to be established
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but its actual ambient outer boundary limits are far in excess of
radiation levels associated with presently-operating nuclear
facilities. 3 5 Thus the EPA has granted the NRC almost complete discretion to adjust emission controls and ambient levels
somatic and genetic
of radiation within the range of3 probable
6
radiation.
low-level
from
harms
Second, the EPA has evaded its responsibilities for nuclear
power plant siting review. Its regulations state that "sound
siting practices will continue to be promoted as in the past and
that facility planners will utilize remote sites with low population densities to the maximum extent feasible.13 7 But reliance
on past practice seems unjustified. Local zoning and planning
authorities still have primary siting power in most states, and
their consideration of exposure and ambient off-site radiation
levels has been noticeably deficient.3 8 Furthermore, although
the NRC siting guidelines do translate emergency dose limits
into site criteria, they have not prevented power plant siting in
areas of high population density. 39 This problem has been
magnified, moreover, by the NRC's failure to observe its own
40
siting guidelines.
At present, the public can rely only on the courts to ensure
that the siting of nuclear facilities is appropriately conducted in
the public interest. However, this path through the courts is
fraught with difficulties. Litigation in this area is costly and
technically complex 4 1 and a variety of procedural restrictions
42
militate against extensive judicial review of agency decisions.
with maximum prevention of environmental and health effects rather than with a
balancing of harm against economic cost and technical feasibility. 33 U.S.C. § 1317
(1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7 (1970).
35 See 42 Fed. Reg. 2858 (Jan. 13, 1977).
36 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
37 40 Fed. Reg. 23,420 (1975) (proposed regulations).
38 See state enabling acts for New York, Maine, and Massachusetts cited in Baram,
State Energy Legislation and the Siting of Facilities, in THE NORTHEASTERN STATES CONFRONT THE ENERGY CRISIS, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (1975).
39 10 C.F.R. § 100 (1976).
40 See Porter County Chapter of the Isaac Walton League of America v. AEC, 515
F.2d 513 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 423 U.S. 12 (1975). However, NRC siting criteria have forced
applicants to abandon several proposed sites.
41 The Supreme Court has ruled that attorney's fees ordinarily cannot be recovered
by a prevailing party (e.g., a public interest group) from a losing party (e.g., a federal or

state agency involved in siting decisions). Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). This ruling makes such public interest initiatives more
difficult to mount.
42 It has been held, for example, that those groups who refrain from participation
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The retreat of the EPA from a role in facility-specific regulation
to the promulgation of general guidelines once again has
weakened the protection of the public health and the environment.
Finally, the EPA has failed to impose any controls upon
certain long-lived radioactive materials such as krypton-85 and
tritium. The EPA has previously acknowledged that:
no methods are available to effectively remove such materials
from the environment once they have been released, and
once released thus imply irreversible commitments for exposure of future generations, except for natural occlusion in
environmental sinks ... it (is) especially important to consider the consequences of irreversible commitment of these
discharges to the environment before they have occurred...
Since control must be instituted long before the impacts
associated with these releases occur, projection of anticipated
health effects which could result from a release of these
radionuclides constitutes a necessary basis for decisions concerning the need for institution of control over their release.
Future decisions ought to consider these dose commitments
with respect to both the types of development that should
occur and the choice of controls that should be imposed...43
Yet, despite this dire language and the exhortations for action
"now" in its earlier assessment, the EPA neglected to impose
controls on such releases in its proposed standards. For example, controls on krypton-85 and iodine-129 have been deferred
to January 1, 1983, when successful demonstration of control
technology may be accomplished; controls on the release of
tritium and carbon-14 have been deferred even more vaguely
to some future time when knowledge of control measures and
their cost have increased.4 4 In this way, the EPA is exercising its
broad discretionary authority to subordinate its responsibility
in rulemaking proceedings may not obtain direct judidal review of the regulations
promulgated. Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Such a ruling precludes
many public interest groups from making court challenges to siting deisions, since
such groups generally mobilize after a particular site has been chosen and evaluated.
43 U.S. OFFIcE OF RADIATION PROGRAMS, ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION DOSE COMMITMENT: AN APPLICATION TO THE NUCLEAR POWER
INDUSTRY 1-3 (Feb. 1974).

44 "Tritium levels ... are not expected to become significant until the late 1980's,
and development programs are in existence for control.... The Agency believes that
the development and installation of control . . . are important objectives, and will
carefully follow the development of new knowledge concerning the impact and control-

lability of these radionucleides." 40 Fed. Reg. 23,422-23 (1975).
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for protection of human health and the environment to the
unrestrained development of nuclear power.
The EPA's reluctance to fulfill its obligations under the
Reorganization Plan, NEPA, FWPCA, SWDA, and the Clean
Air Act may reflect an overly liberal interpretation of administrative preemption doctrine. In Train v. Colorado Public Interest
Research Group,45 the Supreme Court held that the FWPCA's

legislative history reflects a congressional intent not to alter the
NRC's exclusive authority to control emissions of source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials into the nation's waters. 46 The decision limited the application of industrial permits
under FWPCA to the release of minor radioactive materials not
covered by the Atomic Energy Act, such as radium and particle
47
accelerator wastes.

The Colorado PIRG decision does preempt one particular
regulatory route that would have overlapped the NRC's powers. But the EPA should not be allowed to shirk other statutory
responsibilities through unwarranted extension of the scope of
the decision. Restrictions on the authority of the EPA to promulgate effluent standards and issue discharge permits do not
affect its power to develop and implement ambient water qual48
ity standards for radioactive isotopes in the nation's waters.
45 426 U.S. 1 (1976). This was a citizen's suit brought to force the EPA Administrator to perform a "non-discretionary" duty to control radioactive effluents from
nuclear power plants. Both plaintiff and defendant agreed that the sole issue was a
question of law about the meaning of the Federal water Pollution Control Act, as
amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
The statute lists "radioactive materials" among the pollutants to be regulated by the
Administrator without qualifying or restricting their scope. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The
EPA's position, as exemplified in its regulation (40 C.F.R. § 125(x) (1976)), was that the
legislative history of the FWPCA indicated that Congress intended to exempt radioactive materials that were subject to regulation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
from the permit program of the FWPCA. The plaintiff's position, with which the Tenth
Circuit Court agreed, was that the FWPCA meant what it said. If Congress had
intended to make an exemption for radioactivity, it would have done so explicitly.
Colorado Public Interest Research Group v. Train, 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'd,
426 U.S. 1 (1976).
46 426 U.S. at 24.
47 426 U.S. at 8, 23.
48 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)-(c), 1313 (Supp. V 1975). The ColoradoPIRG analysis of
the legislative history of the 1972 Amendment sought to test the applicability of the
FWPCA's permit program (with effluent standards) to AEC-regulated nuclear power
plants. 426 U.S. 1, 10-11. Moreover, the decision created a major exception to the
otherwise all-indusive scheme for water pollution control in the FWPCA. The scheme
requires the EPA to regulate electric generating facilities as point sources, 33 U.S.C. §
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Furthermore, the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 provides
independent authority for EPA control over radioactive
isotopes.in drinking water.4 9 Third, the Court's reliance on the
specific legislative history of the FWPCA in Colorado PIRG
would limit any application of its analysis to the EPA's obligations under NEPA and the Clean Air Act. If such extensions
could be made, moreover, they would not affect the EPA's
power to set ambient standards for radiation exposure. 50 Finally, the Reorganization Plan gave the EPA powers to set and
enforce ambient standards that once belonged to the AEC. 51
Therefore EPA ambient radiation standards would not diminish the NRC's authority under the Atomic Energy Act. 52
The EPA's power to set ambient radiation standards and
review environmental decisions could be used to fill a critical
void in the present unclear regulatory process. First, EPA
ambient standards could provide a countervailing influence
on NRC discretion in the formulation of effluent standards for
individual power plants. The EPA could set a strict floor for
public protection under which the NRC could not go with its
ALARA requirements.5 3 In pursuing this strategy, the EPA
may have to test its authority to enforce ambient standards
against the NRC in the federal courts. 54 Second, EPA development of ambient standards could increase the effectiveness of
1316 (Supp. V 1975), "radioactive material" effluents, § 1362, other wastewater discharges of a polluting nature (such as hot water or anti-corrosion chemicals) from a
nuclear power plant, § 1362(6), and toxic materials, § 1317. The EPA should be
permitted to retain control over ambient radiation water quality standards to maintain
the integrity of the FWPCA.
49 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f(6), 300g-1, 300g-2, 300g-3 (Supp. V 1975). "Section 1401
defines 'contaminant' to mean 'any physical, chemical, biological, or radiological substance or matter in water.' This, of course, would include any radioactive materials
whether or not they originated from any source under the jurisdiction of the AEC."
H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6454, 6469.
50 See note 48 supra.
51 See note 13 supra.

52 The Court in Colorado PIRG appeared to be concerned that the EPA not be
permitted to duplicate a specific area of AEC authority and thus produce ".... a
significant alteration in the pervasive regulatory scheme embodied in the AEA." 426
U.S. at 24.
53 See OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, A CoLLEcTION OF LEGAL OPINIONS 581 (1975).
54 But the explldt grant of authority to the EPA under the Reorganization Plan No.

3 of 1970 for the development of ambient standards should provide strong support for
this claim. See note 13 supra.
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NRC discharge regulations. Present NRC requirements do not
consider adequately the impact of external factors on off-site
radiation levels. 55 The EPA and the NRC could pool their
knowledge and form interagency panels to translate discharge
limits into ambient exposure and to investigate the emission
requirements necessary to attain national health goals. Such
cooperation would promote more thorough understanding of
environmental capacity to absorb low-level radiation without
ecological disruption. Third, the EPA could use its siting review
power to add radiation emission criteria to siting decisions.
Neither the EPA nor the states have translated radiation standards into enforceable siting regulations for nuclear power
facilities. The NRC also excludes discharges from its siting
analysis. 56 But the considerable variation in background
radioactivity and dispersion patterns for discharges among potential sites merit special attention in siting. The legislative
mandate of NEPA should compel the EPA to undertake radiation surveys and evaluations in site review for greater protec57
tion of health and the environment.
In spite of some restrictions from administrative preemption,
the EPA has the power to improve control of radioactive emissions by investigating and setting standards for radiation between discharge and human exposure. Its analyses could assist
in the preparation of more sophisticated effluent standards and
siting criteria. But the hesitance of the agency to perform these
tasks must be overcome. Federal legislation requiring the EPA
to carry out its functions within a specified time period may be
58
necessary to prod the agency into action.
B.

The Role of the States

State and local regulatory bodies have two major sources of
authority that could be exercised to enhance public protection
55 Variations in background radiation can arise from natural conditions, such as

geography, and artificial circumstances, such as degree of exposure to medical x-rays
and population density. See note 9 supra.
56 See text accompanying notes 109-115 supra.
57 See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra.
58 Legislation of this type has been enacted under the general provisions of tie air
and water pollution control acts for other types of pollution. See, e.g., the time limits for
EPA issuance of water quality criteria in the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. V 1975).

1977]

Nuclear Power Plant Radiation

919

from the hazards of ionizing radiation. The first form of regulatory power derives from the requirements of federal legislation. The states act concurrently with the EPA in carrying out
the requirements of the Clean Air Act, the FWPCA, and the
Safe Drinking Water Act. Each of these laws requires EPA
approval of state implementation plans, review of subsequent
state performance, and EPA action upon state default. 59 The
provisions of these laws establish the responsibility of the states
for monitoring and regulating ambient concentrations of radioactive isotopes in the environment.
The general police power of the states provides the other
basis for state determination of acceptable ambient levels of
radiation in the off-site environment. Its traditional concern for
the protection of public health, safety, and welfare supports
extensive supervision of industrial activities. 60 In addition,
police power confers jurisdiction over land use. 6 1 As a result,
state and local governments have primary responsibility for
power plant siting. Because siting influences radiation concentrations, 62 states could use site review to govern nuclear power
plant discharges indirectly.
At least two obstacles have discouraged the states from par59 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1345 (Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C. §
300g-2 (Supp. V 1975). Under the Clean Air Act, the states were to adopt plans to
enforce the EPA's national primary and secondary air standards, subject to the Administrator's approval. The EPA has had to take over enforcement of several state plans
that were inadequate. Under the FWPCA, the states are to set water quality standards
and implement them, subject of the Administrator's approval. The relationship between the state and the EPA is complex here. The states may set stringent standards
and thereby impose a greater burden upon individual polluters than the EPA national
effluent limitations would require. The deadline for achievement of the EPA standards
is 1977. The SDWA provides that the states are to have primary enforcement responsibility under the Act. The states must adopt regulations at least as stringent as the
EPA's national primary and secondary water quality standards, and must also provide
for enforcement that meets with the Administrator's approval. See Interim Primary
Drinking Water Regulations: Notice of Proposed Maximum Contaminant Levels for
Radioactivity, 40 C.F.R. § 141 (1976).
60 U.S. Const. amend. X. The expansive view of the police power was articulated by
Justice Douglas in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954): "Public safety, public health,
morality, peace and quiet, law and order ... merely illustrate the scope of the power
and do not delimit it." 348 U.S. at 32. See generally E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

(1904).

61 See Baram, EnvironmentalLaw and Construction ProjectManagement, 6 PUB. CONT.
L. J. 210 (1974). See generally M. BARAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SITING OF
FACILITIES: ISSUES IN LAND USE AND COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT

62 See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.

(1976).
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ticipating actively in the control of radionuclides. First, federal
preemption doctrine may inhibit state regulatory activity. Ruling on the specific issue of radioactive wastewater effluent standards under FWPCA, the Supreme Court in Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota63 denied the states an independent role
that would interfere with the AEC's power to set emission
standards. The Court stated that the regulation of such discharges is a federal responsibility as a result of federal preemption established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the
subsequent scheme of federal legislation and regulation. 6 4 But
the Court's reasoning should not stop states from setting ambient standards for radiation. This action would not duplicate
the NRC's authority to promulgate effluent limits.6 5 Furthermore, it would be consistent with the requirements of other
federal laws and the traditional state powers.66 The Northern
States decision should also have no effect upon nuclear power
plant site review. The Atomic Energy Act does not permit the
NRC to override local zoning and other site restrictions. The
agency can do no more than disapprove sites proposed by an
applicant.

67

The second impediment to additional state control is the
crudeness of state research. State agencies often lack money
and personnel to investigate possible sites and carry out techni63 405 U.S. 1035 (1972), aff'g 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
64 Id. at 1154.
65 In the Northern States case, the State of Minnesota attempted to regulate the
discharge of radioactive effluents from a power plant, using standards that were
considerably more stringent than those of the AEC. The Eighth Circuit held that
preemption of such regulation was implicit in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and the
Supreme Court approved the holding without comment. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
Minnesota attempted to regulate discharges at the source, not radiation levels in the
ambient environment. The Eighth Circuit's reasoning dealt with the congressional
intent to preempt AEC control over nuclear power plant effluents. The Atomic Energy
Act itself forbade such an action on the part of a state agency. 42 U.S.C. § 202 1(c)(1);
447 F.2d at 1149 n.6. This decision and a broad reading of Section 274 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 have led some industry commentators to sweeping conclusions
about the scope of federal preemption. See, e.g., A. MURPHY & B. LAPIEtRE, NUCLEAR
MORATORIUM LEGISLATION IN THE STATES AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE: A CASE OF

EXPREss PREEMPTION (Atomic Industrial Forum, 1975). However, these judgments
deny the historic persistence of the state police power in its modern forms (e.g.,
shellfish regulation, zoning law) that can be used to control various aspects of nuclear
power generation. Control over ambient levels of radiation would appear to remain
with the states. See note 45 supra.
66 See text accompanying notes 59-62 supra.
67 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2133 (1970).
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cal studies for standards. They become dependent on federal
agencies, especially the NRC, for information and prepackaged
regulations. 68 This problem should ease as more states recognize the need for stronger regulation. State legislatures could
69
appropriate revenue sharing funds for this purpose.
In spite of these barriers, state agencies have become more
involved in the regulation of radioactive emissions. State and
local authorities have established various criteria and standards
for off-site exposure to radiation. 70 And several states have also
developed radiation standards for ambient water quality as part
of their effort to achieve water quality objectives of the
FWPCA.7 1 Finally, many states supplement zoning and subdivision controls with special boards and procedures to govern
72
the siting of power plants and transmission lines.
68 On the issue of state resources, a World Health Organization survey noted:
While 47 ... states have adopted legislation ... control.., ionizing radiations,

there are major divergences in the implementing regulations .... Only 50
percent have adopted most of the provisions of the model regulations (suggested by the Council of State Governments, and drawn up with the collaboration of the AEC and the PHS.... eleven states have no regulations for the
control of radioactive materials not subject to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
...

The following are reported to be major inadequacies . . . (1) lack of

regulations or failure to update regulations ... (2) insufficient funds and
personnel ... (4) lack of uniformity in the control of health hazards from the
use of radium and accelerator-produced radionuclides including safety standards, inspection requirements, regulations and enforcement.
See U.N. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PROTECTION AGAINST IONIZING RADIATION: A
SURVEY OF CURRENT WORLD LEGISLATION 277-83 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SURVEY OF
CURRENT WORLD LEGISLATION]. As for state dependence on the NRC, "Suggested
Regulations for Control of Radiation" (SSRCR) have been promulgated and updated
periodically following an original initiative by the Council of State Governments, the
AEC, the U.S. Public Health Service and other federal agencies. The lead role has been
played by the AEC because the SSRCR deals with power plant radiation, and the latest
SSRCR, published in 1974, also involved inputs from the Food and Drug Administration and the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors representing state
agencies. Health, Education and Welfare: Suggested State Regulations for Control of
Radiation, 40 Fed. Reg. 29,749 (1975). EPA was notably absent from this most recent

SSRCR effort, further indicating EPA reluctance to assume important responsibilities
for the control of radiation.
69 Environmental protection currently makes up about six to ten percent of
shared-revenue allocations among the states. R. NATHAN & C. ADAMS, REVENUE SHARING: THE SECOND ROUND 68 (1977).
70 See SURVEY OF CURRENT WORLD LEGISLATION, supra note 70, at 277-83.

71 See U.S.

ENVT'L PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS

CRITERIA

DIGEST: A COMPILATION OF FEDERALISTATE CRITERIA ON RADIATION (1972).
72 The NRC has no express authority to'acquire power plant sites for utilities, nor
does it have authority to change or override state and local laws governing land use; the
NRC is limited to considering the suitability of those plant sites proposed by applicants
for plant construction licenses. Applicants must therefore acquire title or lease to sites,
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Future initiatives may be even more extensive. As more states
adopt coherent land use and coastal zone management pro-

grams and empower sophisticated state or regional siting
boards, they will have the opportunity to restrict or confine new

sources of radiation hazards before power plant construction

begins.7 3 Whatever the EPA or the NRC may decide to do, this

growing state involvement will have a substantial impact upon
the regulation of ionizing radiation.
The federal government should encourage active state participation in the protection of the public from the hazards of
radiation. One step in this direction would be a more accommodating preemption doctrine. The federal courts may be
tempted to apply more severe restrictions on state activity as
national energy policy matures.7 4 Congress should remove this
economic and political question from the purview of the courts
75
by explicitly consenting to certain types of state regulation.
The congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), a
disinterested and capable body, could provide advice. 7 6 If Congress refuses to assume a more sympathetic attitude toward
state regulation, it may do more than simply increase the risk to
public health from radiation. The future of nuclear power itself
and conform to use restrictions under prevailing state and local laws, in addition to
securing NRC approval under NRC regulations and guidelines which have been promulgated to insure public safety.
73 See Baram, supra note 38.
74 The history of state regulation of airport noise may be a helpful analogue to the
potential development of state regulation of onsite and offsite radiation. Under their
police powers, a variety of states and municipalities have sought to control aircraft noise
by enacting local laws to regulate flight paths, schedules, and off-site noise levels.
Federal court decisions, in the absence of congressional resolution of the preemption
problem, have consistently extended the scope of federal preemption for regulation of
civilian aircraft activities at the expense of state and local authority. See, e.g., City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973). Ifa similar trend develops for
nuclear power, efforts by the states to control radiation, either through site review or
regulation of ambient off-site radiation levels, would be invalid whenever such control
obstructs or interferes with NRC regulation of its licensees.
75 See H.R. 441, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), a bill introduced by Congressman
Hamilton Fish (R.-N.Y.) that would allow the states to regulate the emission of radioactive effluents concurrently with the NRC. Section 3 of the Act provided that
... it is the intent of this Act to establish the concurrent authority of the several
States to regulate such radioactive emissions, including the authority to enforce standards for such radioactive emissions, which permit lesser quantities
of such emissions from such facilities than do the standards established by the
Commission.
76 2 U.S.C. § 475 (1970).
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depends on state acceptance, local values, and the availability of
77
plant sites.

II.

CHOOSING A DECISION RULE FOR POWER PLANT RADIATION

Judicial review of administrative agency actions often involves examination of the procedure the agency follows to
make its decisions.7 8 If the procedure seems irrational or ignores some elements of a problem that Congress wanted the
agency to consider, the court may overrule the agency and
force it to reevaluate its conclusions through a better procedure.7 9 Sometimes an agency that possesses substantial discretion can avoid exacting judicial scrutiny by instituting a decision
rule that appears to incorporate agency expertise and scientific
detachment. 80 Thus the AEC, whose instructions from Congress on safety were vague, adopted a pre-regulatory costbenefit balancing test to choose radiation emission standards
that were "as low as reasonably achievable" (ALARA).81
Cost-benefit analysis is a technique widely used by administrators in the public and private sectors for choosing among
alternative actions.8 2 It involves a comparison of the sum of the
expected gains or benefits to be derived from a proposed project or action with the sum of the expected losses or costs which
should accrue from the project or action. Usually the only
benefits or costs that can be included in this form of analysis are
those that can be quantified and expressed in monetary
77 For judicial recognition of the role that local values and laws should play in
federal agency decisions under NEPA, see Maryland-National Capitol Park and Planning Commission v. U.S. Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
78 See Stewart, The Reformulation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.

1667, 1674-75 (1975).
79 Id. at 1673-74.
80 Such a test appears to promote well-reasoned administrative action and judges
are likely to accept it if only because they do not feel competent to review its results. See
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 666-68 (1976). But see Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (E.D. Wis.)
affd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 417
F.2d 615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Stewart, supra note 78, at 1702-11.
81 See definition of ALARA in text accompanying note 92 infra.
82 See generally R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY & PRACTICE 134-84 (1973). It is important to note that even where there is only one proposal
under consideration, there are two alternative actions: to undertake the project or to do
nothing. This yes-no character of pure cost-benefit analysis creates difficulties when a
number of alternatives are available.
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terms.8 3 If the resulting sum of the benefits equals or exceeds
the sum of the costs, the project or action is 'justified" and can
be undertaken. In choosing among alternatives, the analyst
prefers the project or action with the largest benefit-to-cost
ratio. 4
A cost-benefit calculation requires a series of analytical steps.
Each expected cost and benefit must be identified and its magnitude determined. A monetary value must then be assigned to
each cost and benefit. These values can only be expected values
because they reflect a range of possible magnitudes reduced by
the individual probabilities of their occurrence. Each expected value must then be discounted to reflect its present
value.8 5 Finally, all costs and benefits must be summed; the
ratio of these sums is the benefit-to-cost ratio.
Cost-benefit analysis can be a useful tool for raising the quality of administrative decisions. It can force government officials
to review all of the possible consequences of proposed actions
and to make some estimates, however rough, of their size and
probability. It provides a means for holding bureaucrats accountable for their actions.
But allowing cost-benefit analysis to determine how strictly
risks from nuclear power plant operation will be managed is a
dangerous and unwarranted extension of its proper role.
Cost-benefit analysts of optional projects can be reasonably
certain about capturing the full costs and benefits, even if the
appropriate valuation of these costs and benefits may be arbitrary.8 6 As this section will demonstrate, however, uncertainty
83 See L. MEREWITZ & S. SOSNICK, THE BUDGET'S NEW CLOTHES 269-70 (1971).
84 Elementary economic theory teaches that at the point where total benefits will
most exceed total costs, the marginal benefits and marginal costs are equal. This can be
called a "balance point"
85 The concept of present value is based on the fact that the value of a dollar to be
received or paid out in the future is less than the value of a dollar to be received or paid
out at present. Since the benefits and costs from a project accrue over time, their values
must be reduced ("discounted") to reflect the present value. A cost or benefit is then
determined by multiplying the expected value of the benefit or cost by a discount rate
which reflects a time rate of preference for money and the time at which the cost or
benefit is expected to accrue.
86 Some of the reasons for the relative ease of cost-benefit analysis in development
projects are the more certain policy costs when enforcement of a law is not central to the
government action, the greater likelihood that a project will be contained within a single
assessable region, and the more tangible benefits of a project. For a discussion of the
special problems of cost-benefit analysis in pollution control, see Peskin & Seskin,
Introductionand Overview, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION POLICY 1-33
(H. Peskin & E. Seskin eds. 1976).
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about costs, benefits, and the validity of the analyses themselves
render present NRC judgments about acceptable levels of
radiation unsound. Replacement of variable cost-beneficial
guidelines with strict emission standards implemented through
cost-effective techniques could better protect the interest of all
affected groups.
A.

The ALARA Concept -Administrative

Shortcomings

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission inherited a cost-benefit
test for power plant radiation embodied in the general principle that radiation exposure should be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." In 1970 the AEC ruled that "radiation
exposures and releases of radioactive materials [be set] . . .as
far below the limits specified ... as practicable. ' 87 This statement is the conceptual source for significant features of subsequent AEC regulation of its licensees, particularly the AEC's
Appendix L1 Appendix I provides "numerical guides for design
objectives and limiting conditions for operation to meet the
criterion 'as low as is reasonably achievable' for radioactive
material in light-water-cooled nuclear power reactor effluents.8 9 Appendix I does not provide mandatory numerical standards or criteria, but merely serves to give license applicants
"qualitative guidance" as to one acceptable method of establishing compliance with the "as low as is reasonably achievable"
requirement. An applicant is free to persuade the NRC that
some alternative method provides for a level of radiation exposure and release of radioactive materials "as low as is reasonably
achievable." 90 As a practical matter, the high cost of such per87 35 Fed. Reg. 18,587-88 (1970). The term "as low as practicable" was replaced by
"as low as is reasonably achievable" on July 2, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,029 (1975). The
NRC stated that this was not a substantive change, but was only intended to clarify the

purposes of the dose limitation.
88 36 Fed. Reg.. 11,113 (1971) (Proposed Appendix I). Public hearing commenced
January 20, 1972. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued its opinion and final
version of the regulations on April 30, 1975. 40 Fed. Reg. 33,029 (1975).
89 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Rulemaking Hearings on Numerical Guides
for Design Objectives and Limiting Conditions for Operation to Meet the Criterion "As
Low as Practicable" for Radioactive Material in Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power
Reactor Effluents, Docket No. RM-50-2 (April 30, 1975) [hereinafter referred to as
NRC Opinion]. The Concluding Statement of Position of the Regulatory Staff from
these rulemaking hearings is reprinted in 10 C.F.R. § 50, app. I, at 312.
90 It should be emphasized that the Appendix I guides as here adopted by the
Commission are not radiation protection standards. The numerical guides of
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suasion and the low probability of success make it an unrealistic
option for most applicants. 91
The NRC's cost-benefit criteria contemplate wide-ranging
and recurring tests for suitable regulation of power plant design and operation. Initially, the formal definition of the
ALARA concept states a number of factors that must be considered in the cost-benefit analysis:
as low as is reasonably achievable taking into account the
state of technology, and the economics of improvements in
relation to benefits to the public health and safety, and other
societal and socioeconomic considerations, and in relation to
the utilization of atomic energy in the public interest. 92
The ALARA principle also appears to require that the NRC's
tests should be employed to decrease allowable discharges as it
becomes economically feasible to do so. Finally, the lower levels
of discharge must be "reasonably achievable" or "practicable."
The ALARA concept and its cost-benefit analysis would seem
to offer an attractive form of regulation because it considers the
potential consequences of an action before adopting it. By
employing a "rational" method of evaluation, the agency can
exercise the discretion of a legislature in choosing whether to
impose a design or operation requirement that produces a
certain level of radiation discharge. Moreover, each incremental reduction in emissions requires its own cost-benefit analysis,
so that a process of iteration can reach an optimal level of
Appendix I which we announce today are a quantitative expression of the
meaning of the requirement that radioactive material in effluents released to
unrestricted areas from light-water-cooled nuclear power reactors be kept "as
low as practicable."
NRC Opinion, supra note 88, at 2.
91 Various Regulatory Guides based on Appendix I are now being issued to govern
power plant siting, design, and performance, making the mandatory effect of Appendix
I an even stronger force. See, e.g., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Regulatory Guides

1.109, 1.110 & 1.111 (March 1976).

Since Appendix I was adopted by the NRC only as "qualitative guidance" to license
applicants, the question of agency accountability under it immediately arises. Judicial
reviews of such a "quasi-rule" may not be rigorous, particularly where the guidance
expressly allows alternative standards to be presented by applicants. The NRC thus may
be less accountable in its rulemaking under Appendix I than in the promulgation of
more conventional rules and standards. The agency has thereby reserved itself substantial discretion of numerical limitations for implementing ALARA and remains
bound only to the 500 millirem total individual exposure limit the AEC adopted in
1960.
92 10 C.F.R. § 50.34a (1976).
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emissions. We might hope that Congress would act the same
way if it had the time and expertise to make such detailed
determinations.
Unfortunately, the cost-benefit approach of ALARA cannot
be adapted well to the ordinary operations of an administrative
agency. In a number of ways, the NRC and its predecessor AEC
have vitiated the strength of the ALARA principle by faulty
analysis and insufficient modification of enforcement efforts to
fit the conclusions of cost-benefit studies. These deficiencies
have consistently weakened the protection of the public from
radioactive power plant emissions. The endemic character of
these failings will suggest that pre-regulatory cost-benefit analysis is not a useful substitute for legislative judgments on acceptable radiation standards.
One continuing problem has been the adverse effect of inadequate information on the quality of the cost-benefit calculation. In the period before the adoption of the ALARA concept,
the AEC licensing process suffered from a lack of sufficient
information about the long-term health effects of ionizing
radiation. Consequently, the AEC had no "rational" (costbenefit) basis for radiation exposure limits. It made what it
thought to be conservative assumptions. Disputes between the
AEC staff and a utility over the degree of radiation control to
be imposed were resolved through negotiation. Negotiation
resulted in the imposition of arbitrary numerical values.
Court challenges to AEC standard-setting under the previous
arbitrary system 93 led to the adoption of the ALARA concept in
1970. 94 The proposed Appendix I was designed to impose costbeneficial interim conditions on nuclear power plant licensees. 95 Yet the AEC's "Staff System" test lacked a primary element of cost-benefit analysis in that it had no dollar values for
health damage from exposure of the total population to radiation. 96 From 1970 to 1974, the AEC set discharge limits for
maximum individual exposure and varied them on a case-by93 See, e.g., Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970) (challenging 10
C.F.R. § 20); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (challenging AEC noncompliance with NEPA requirements).
94 35 Fed. Reg. 18,385 (1970).
95 NRC Opinion, supra.note 88, at 2-4.
96 See Concluding Statement, supra note 8, at 41-43.
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case basis for individual plants. 97 This procedure ignored the
cost of genetic damage from increases in low-level radiation
above long-term background rates.98 Control measures that
could have benefitted the populace as a whole but not the most
exposed individual were not implemented.
As part of its formal approval of the Appendix I procedure, 9
the NRC modified the "Staff System" in an attempt to cure its
defects. It adopted an interim dollar value of $1,000 per manrem1 °0 of societal exposure for use in cost-benefit analyses.101
In addition, the NRC retained limits on individual exposure,
but added a requirement of further control measures if they
were justified by the benefits from reducing total population
exposure.1 0 2 Although these changes avoid some of the consequences of past deficiencies in information, other problems
remain. First, the dollar values chosen for societal exposure to
radiation are themselves arbitrary and conservative. The NRC
has proposed rule-making hearings to set a final value, but has
not yet held them. 10 3 Second, ALARA cost-benefit analysis and
resulting regulations remain very dependent upon the state of
scientific knowledge about radiation. The gaps in current understanding include empirical evidence on the relationship between plant operation and emission levels as well as evidence on
health effects. To ensure that ALARA and other conditions are
met, the NRC requires licensees to monitor their operations
and send the results to the agency. Licensees collect data on
actual emissions, off-site levels, and land use patterns in the
vicinity of the plant, ensuring, at least in theory, that application of ALARA-based regulations will be responsive to changes
97 See W. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 284.

98 See

ADVISORY COMM. ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION, RE-

PORT TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
EFFECTS ON POPULATIONS OF ExPOSURE TO Low LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATION 1-2

(1972). [hereinafter cited as BEIR REPORT].
99 NRC Opinion, supra note 88.
100 A "rem" is the basic unit of radiation measurement. A millirem is onethousandth of a rem. A "man-rem" is the product of exposure multiplied by population. Thus 1,000 individuals exposed to twenty millirems of radiation would equal
20,000 man-millirems, or twenty man-reins. Doses to the most exposed individual are
expressed in millirems. The exposure of a large population is expressed in man-reins.
See BEIR REPORT, supra note 98, at 10.
101 NRC Opinion, supra note 88, at 11.
102 Id. at 11.
103 Id. at 90.
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or unexpected conditions. 10

4
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But the path from operational

data to design calculation to regulatory modifications has been
blocked by conceptual difficulties. The NRC, the EPA, and. the
energy industry all agree that present
calculational models
10 5
overestimate radiation exposure.

Although this uncertainty would appear to err on the side of
caution, the administrative practice of the NRC often eliminates the cushion. On the assumption that the calculated levels
are unnecessarily low, the NRC allows certain facilities to release larger quantities of radioactive materials on a case-by-case
basis. 10 6 This discretionary action is unjustified because the data
mentioned above demonstrate that operators can control emissions more strictly without financial hardship. The spirit of the
ALARA cost-benefit analysis and the absence of a threshold for
health harms10 7 demand that lower emission levels be required
wherever economically feasible. The actual implementation of
ALARA cost-benefit analysis places excessive emphasis upon
knowledge of radiation effects and insufficient emphasis upon
the economics of emission control.
Even if the NRC had adequate data available for ALARA
balancing tests, the agency's limited application of their results
would continue to discount their merits. In at least four ways,
the NRC had undercut the possible virtues of pre-regulatory
cost-benefit analysis. First, the agency has not consistently
applied the standards to all nuclear power plants. Although the
ALARA guideline is one of the most important of numerous
design factors built into NRC regulations for licensing new
facilities, it should also have implications for "backfitting" existing plants as well. "Backfitting" involves the addition of costbeneficial radiation control to existing plants. The process is
generally more expensive than installation of similar controls at
the time of construction. Yet if a rigorously-applied cost-benefit
104 See also Monitoring Radioactivity Releases, General Design Criterion No. 64, 10
C.F.R. § 50, app. A (1976); U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, Regulatory Guide 4.1 (1974).
105 NRC Opinion, supra note 88, at 33, 126-30.
106 Appendix I criteria are mere guidelines for agency action. See 10 C.F.R. § 50, app.
I, at 309. The only mandatory limit that the agency must observe is the 170 millirem
per year increment to background levels as maximum individual exposure that was
promulgated by the AEC. See note 91 supra; note 132 infra; BEIR REPORT, supra note
98, at 2.
107 See note 8 supra.
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analysis indicates that a particular facility should be backfitted,
the ALARA guideline should compel the utility to take such
action. Nevertheless, the NRC has left the matter of backfitting
existing reactors for future consideration on a case-by-case
basis, avoiding any generic approach to the problem. 08
Second, the NRC has not applied ALARA cost-benefit analysis to its review of nuclear power plant site selection. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires the agency
to review alternative sites available to a construction license
applicant. 10 9 But the NRC has continued to play a negative role
of specifying geological, population, and other constraints
upon siting." 0 Moreover, the NEPA requirement does not
compel the use of ALARA cost-benefit analysis; the site need
only be the alternative that best meets NRC's traditional criteria."' Thus the primary siting role has fallen to the utility, the
cognizant state energy boards," 2 and local authorities through
their zoning and land use powers. Many considerations, including political, cultural, environmental, and economic factors, are
involved in the process of site selection, and it is appropriate
that the basic authority over sites rests with the state and local
governments." 3 Yet the importance of siting for radiation control

14

makes the translation of ALARA results into siting cri-

teria for supplementing state concerns essential." 5 The NRC's
failure to employ ALARA for this purpose decreases the qual108 NRC Opinion, supra note 88, at 11. Backfitting also becomes a possibility for the
current generation of reactors to be licensed under Appendix I, for example, where
actual growth of the receptor population is markedly different from the expected
population growth used in design calculations at the time of the original licensing,
Under such conditions, the NRC has the option of either "backfitting" the plant in
question or restricting its operation. Id.
Neither the NRC nor the states have confronted this issue of receptor population
growth and its implications for plant operation. It is, admittedly, a politically tough
question involving social planning and land use restrictions for the environs of plant
sites.
109 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335 (1970).
110 10 C.F.R. § 100 (1976).
111 The Calvert Cliffs decision calls for AEC use of the full environmental impact
statement in facility decisions, and for such decisions to be founded on a "finely-tuned;
balanced analysis." 449 F.2d 1109, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1971). This clearly does not require
selection of the optimal site on the basis of ALARA criteria and conditions.
112 See Baram, supra note 38.
113 See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
114 See notes 9-12 supra and accompanying text.
115 See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
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ity of regulation and the value of pre-regulatory cost-benefit
analysis.
Third, the NRC has attempted to circumvent ALARA to
achieve standardization of reactor design. In order to achieve
cost reductions, quality control, and enhanced safety, the NRC
has adopted the goal of replacing the traditional practice of the
custom design of reactors with the standardization of design. 116
The standardization review process would "test" possible reactor designs in different hypothetical sites, such as kale, river,
and offshore, with certain assumed population distributions.
For a specific facility, site review ideally would be reduced to
whether the actual site characteristics are no worse than the
hypothetical.
ALARA can conflict with some aspects of standardization,
since it calls for site-specific balancing of several factors to
determine design limitations and standardization provides for a
generic approach to design limitations for plants that fall within
certain site and population categories. Appendix I could integrate ALARA with standardization with some amount of compromise. The individual dose limits are already standardized
because they are derived from calculations involving hypothetical standard reactors and standard sites.' 1 Case-by-case
pressure on the population dose is provided by the requirement that all controls justified on a cost-benefit basis be added.
If an actual site is worse than the standard site in some respects, radiation control measures must be added until the total
population dose is brought within the cost-benefit value." 8
Some percentage of these cases will not require the additional
treatment.
116 See Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2039, 2232b. See also U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, Policy Statement on Standardization of Nuclear Power Plants (April 28,1972);
U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, Statement on Methods for Achieving Standardization of
Nuclear Power Plants (March 5, 1973).
117 Concluding Statement, supra note 8, at 85.
118 Since the NRC is not affirmatively involved in siting, there is still the possibility

that an inferior site (from an radiation safety point of view) will be selected because of
local or state land use decisions and utility acquisitions. However, the population would
still be protected from radiation by the cost-benefit provisions, and the only undesirable
effect would be an increase in the cost of electricity produced by the plant as compared

with the electricity produced at some other site. Furthermore, the state arena is
probably a preferable location for these tradeoffs to be made between dollars and land
use objectives.
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But the NRC has attempted to standardize reactor design by
cutting back on the number of radiation criteria that must be
met. In York Committeefor a Safe Environmentv. NRC,'1 9 the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the NRC cannot consider
the satisfaction of a single numerical guideline, the
radioiodine-thyroid dose limit of 15 millirem per year, to be the
equivalent of meeting its ALARA requirements because
[T]he Commission definition [of ALARA] requires consideration of health and safety effects, costs, the state of technology, and utilization of atomic energy in the public interest. While the last two factors may be constant for any
reactor built or operating during a particular time period,
the first two will presumably vary depending on the circumstances of each reactor. Since two of the four factors which
determine whether radioactive emissions are "as low as practicable" are not constants, the Commission is precluded from
determining that any particular positive
level of emissions
120
satisfies its requirement in all cases.
Since Appendix I itself specifies that, in addition to satisfying the
numerical guides,
the applicant shall include in the radwaste system all items of
reasonably demonstrated technology that when added to the
system sequentially and in order of diminishing cost-benefit
ratio effect reductions in dose to the population reasonably
expected to be within 50 miles of the reactor... ,121

the court concluded that the "... 'as low as practicable' standard
requires individual consideration of the costs and benefits of
reducing radiation emissions from any particular reactor below
the numerical guidelines.'

22

The decision in York Committee does put the NRC on notice
that it will be held accountable for the application of ALARA
and cost-benefit analysis to individual nuclear power plant
licensees. However, the number of criteria involved in the test
and the complexities of their interaction1 23 may make court
119 527 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
120 Id. at 814-15.
121 10 C.F.R. § 50, app. I, at 310.
122 527 F.2d at 814-15.
123 The ALARA test requires consideration of the state of technology, the cost of
technology, public health benefits, social conditions, the effect of controls on employment, and the value of promoting atomic energy. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
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evaluation of the NRC's performance under ALARA difficult.
1 24
Recent Carter Administration pressure for standardization
may be difficult for the agency to resist. If pre-regulatory tests
are desirable, they will suffer at the hands of the NRC.
Fourth, the NRC permits licensees to delay compliance with
ALARA guidelines. These opportunities grew out of an agency
compromise on occasional excessive discharges of ionizing
radiation by some nuclear power plants. The nuclear industry
argued that temporary violations of performance standards
must be tolerated because complex systems always vary in performance, insufficient evidence exists to prove that public
health is endangered by routine emissions, and continuous
supplies of electric power should be maintained.12 5 In opposition, some participants in the Appendix I hearings advocated
that limitations established under Appendix I for specific plants
be treated as absolutes.' 2 6 The NRC chose enforcement flexibility in requiring that
[I]f the quantity of radioactive material actually released in
effluents - during any calendar quarter is such that the
resulting radiation exposure, calculated on the same basis as
the respective design objective exposure, would exceed
one-half the design objective annual exposure - the licensee
shall:
1. Make an investigation to identify the causes for such
release rates;
2. Define and initiate a program of corrective action; and
3. Report these actions to the Commission within 30 days
from the end of the quarter during which the release
occurred. 27
Two features of this regulation reveal the potential for delay.
First, the licensee may exceed the emission standards indefinitely by simply failing to report to the NRC. The NRC
does not monitor effluents in a systematic fashion. 28 Second,
It seems unlikely that these variables would be independent of one another. The value
of promoting atomic energy, for example, may be closely related to economic conditions and public attitudes about nuclear power vis-4-vis other energy alternatives.
124 See Carter'sFrustrationson Nuclear Policy, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 26, 1977, at 62.
125 NRC Opinion, supra note 88, at 17-19.
126 Id. at 105.
127 Id.
128 See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
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the compliance actions need not be completed within the reporting period.
Of course, the utility's ability to ignore the guidelines is not
absolute. The NRC may "require the licensee to take such
action as the Commission deems appropriate."1 2 9 The Commission has broad discretionary authority, for example, to take
action against a licensee who persists in operating in violation of
the regulations without corrective action. However, past experience indicates that the NRC has not acted quickly to ensure
enforcement of this regulation. 130
Enforcement delays endanger ALARA cost-benefit analysis
because they disrupt the iterative process of tighter standards.
Cost-benefit tests made during a particular period are tied to
the control costs and economic conditions of that period. If
licensees can delay implementation of design and operational
guidelines, they can avoid more stringent emission control until
costly backfitting would be necessary to comply with updated
standards. Alternatively, the licensee could wait until economic
conditions worsened and plea hardship to receive looser guidelines. As a result, ALARA guidelines could fall far behind the
strongest feasible protection of public health. The preregulatory cost-benefit test will always be susceptible to delays. A
certain amount of delay is built into the regulatory process
because the NRC must calculate the actual spread of radioac131
If
tivity through the environment for enforcement purposes.
ALARA is to have any effect, the NRC must promulgate additional regulations setting forth criteria for a program of cor129 10 C.F.R. § 50.36(a)(2) (1976).
130 Difficulties in the operation of Vermont Yankee and other facilities, resulting in
release above prescribed levels, have aroused public interest groups and state and local
health authorities, particularly in ight of the failure of the NRC to respond with timely
enforcement.
The Commission therefore faces a dilemma. Its administrators must balance the
known costs of reducing the operating level or of closing a power plant against the risks
caused by indeterminate exposure of the public to new levels of radioactive emissions.
Given that the initial design calculations are believed to be highly conservative, a NRC
official may decide to allow the situation to continue for some months. But he is unable
to present a rational defense of this action because of the broader goal of minimizing
emissions to protect the public health. Nevertheless, the courts have been sympathetic
to delay when "further study" is undertaken by the NRC. See Nader v. NRC, 513 F.2d
1045 (D.C. Cir. 1975), for an example of judicial tolerance of NRC delay on the
problems of emergency core cooling systems.
131 NRC Opinion, supra note 88, at 33-34.
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rective action with specific time periods for its implementa13 2
tion.
Experience with AEC and NRC actions under ALARA has

indicated that pre-regulatory cost-benefit tests for radiation
emission controls fail to constrain the discretion of agencies to

ignore their own stated goals of increasing protection of the
public. Inadequacies of information for cost-benefit analyses
can be turned arbitrarily against stricter regulation. Furthermore, the agency can choose not to apply the test and its
outcome to activities that fall outside the narrow licensing pro-

cedure. Finally, licensees can disrupt the progress of ALARA
by delaying compliance with ALARA guidelines. The federal

courts may be able to provide some check on agency discretion
by scrutinizing agency actions under NEPA.13 3 But the com132 See Criteria for Determining Enforcement Action and Categories of NonCompliance and other portions of 10 G.F.R. § 2 (1976), for specifications on enforcement issued by the NRC to date. See also U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON ABNORMAL OCCURRENCES: JAN-JUNE 1975 (1975), which

provides interim criteria for determination of abnormal occurrences in nuclear power
plants. Of particular interest in this report is the rule that off-site receptor exposure
does not qualify as abnormal unless it is in excess of 500 millirems, far in excess of
limitations now imposed under ALARA. This rule provides further evidence that,
despite a decade of technological advances, 500 millirems is still the only enforceable
emissions limit of the NRC.
133 NRC decisions must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4335 (1970), enacted by Congress in 1969 and made
applicable to federal administrative agencies in 1970. NEPA requires federal agencies
to assess the effects on environmental quality of proposed "major" actions. 42 U.S.C. §
433 1(c). Such major actions include the issuance of construction and operating permits
for nuclear power plants, Licensing and Regulatory Policy and Procedure for Environmental Protection, 10 C.F.R. § 51 (1976), and the promulgation of agency rules
governing the performance of facilities and activities using radioactive materials, see,
e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 5,356 (1974). The courts have also interpreted the development of the
fast breeder reactor as a major action. See Scientist's Institute for Public Information v.
AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Under the Act, each federal agency is required to
issue environmental impact statements discussing the range of anticipated environmental effects of the project and alternatives to the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4432
(1970).
With the enactment of NEPA, it now seems that there are three balancing processes
potentially applicable in the NRC process of approving an application by a utility for a
license to operate a nuclear power facility. The first is the use of cost-benefit analysis by
the NRC in promulgating agency standards and other rules of general applicability to
power plant performance. The second use of cost-benefit analysis by the NRC is in the
agency's promulgating limitations for aspecfic power plant. Finally, the NRC must use a
balancing analysis under NEPA to determine whether or not the separate construction
or operating licenses should be issued for a specific plant.
The first two applications of cost-benefit analysis are required by Appendix I and other
NRC regulations. For the dual licensing procedures of the third step, the NEPA
mandate for "balancing analyses" is equally clear. The relationship of all of these
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plexity of the cost-benefit analysis may strain judicial expertise 134 and require a legislative solution.
B. The ALARA Concept-Implementation Problems
Accurate accounting for both costs and benefits is essential
when the imposition of regulation depends upon the outcome
of a cost-benefit balancing test. Each level of ALARA analysis
defines a public safety objective that is either accepted or rejected after the test is completed. If imputed values of costs or
benefits are incorrect, stricter feasible radiation emission control might not be required and unnecessary injury may be
inflicted.
Scholarly examination and limited applications of the costbenefit concept have shown that it is an imprecise tool for
making initial decisions about regulation. Cost-benefit analysis
has been a worthy addition to the evaluation of public development projects, where opportunity costs can be linked to
market rates of interest and benefits are positive and predictaapplications to each other is still undeveloped, although a federal court has recently
cautioned that the NEPA requirement applicable to the issuance of an operating license
may not be short-circuited by automatic qualification of a plant that has passed the first
two tests. Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But for
the specific case before it, the court concluded:
Apart from the requirements of NEPA or similar ones already implicit
under AEA (Atomic Energy Act), it would be pointless, and a waste of agency
resources, to require the AEC to reapply efforts that have already gone into its
basic health and safety regulations in individual licensing proceedings, in the
absence of some evidence that a particular facility presents risks outside the
parameters of the original rule making. And in evaluating the sufficiency of
agency determinations in particular cases it would be stultifying formalism to
disregard the whole record and test AEC compliance by only the evidence
received at so-called "health and safety" hearings; or NEPA compliance only
on the basis of so-called "environmental" hearings.
524 F.2d at 1300. This judicial decision promotes administrative efficiency by eschewing duplication of balancing analyses, and seems to make good sense. But it is dear that
such efficiency is justified only when the risks and benefits appropriate for the facilitylicensing balancing task under NEPA have been adequately considered in the prior
balancing undertaken by the agency under it own regulations (e.g. Appendix I). Determination of these justifying circumstances is a complex task which now rests ultimately
with the courts. The extent to which the courts can handle this difficult task responsibly
will therefore depend on judicial willingness to examine the substantive features of
agency decision processes, and the development of judicial expertise in analyzing the
application of cost-benefit analysis.
134 For an analysis ofjudicial review in this area and its limitations, see Leventhal,
EnvironmentalDecision-Makingand the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1975).
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ble.13 5 This section will show, however, that the use of costbenefit analysis for risk management will reduce public protection from the danger of ionizing radiation without commensurate social gains.
Because information is a scarce resource that can be costly to
obtain,1 3 6 the choice of regulatory framework will affect the
outcome of the cost-benefit test.137 The ALARA test contemplates that the NRC will exert equal efforts to amass information on costs and benefits and will weight all of the elements
equally.' 38 But several difficulties involved in determining benefits may tip the balance in favor of well-specified control costs
and against stricter restraints on radioactive discharges. First,
the limits of present scientific knowledge about the effects of
radiation on human health hinder identification of future benefits. New research in this field has always persuaded government officials to lower allowable emissions.' 3 9 Future reductions may be too late to prevent damage from present levels of
discharge. Second, regulators may not properly value benefits
to future generations from radiation control. Present interests
may be overvalued because they can reap the benefits of
40
cheaper electrical energy without absorbing the genetic costs.'
Social discount rates are chosen arbitrarily and can be applied
more confidently to positive future benefits than to the avoidance of future costs.' 4 ' Third, the assumption that present

social values will remain immutable over the forecasted period
leads to conservative estimates of future benefits. "Fragile" intangibles such as aesthetics and ecological health are excluded
from the analysis.' 42 These considerations may grow in impor135 See Luft, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Public Policy Implementation:From Normative to

Positive Analysis, 24 Pun. POL'Y 437, 437-38 (1976).
136 See Stigler, Imperfections in the Capital Markets, 75 J. POL. ECON. 291 (1967).
137 See Crocker, Cost-Benefit Analyses of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT
POLICY, supra note 86, at 342-43.

ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION

138 See text accompanying note 92 supra.
139 See BEIR REPORT, supra note 98, at 1-2; W. PATrERSON, supra note 5, at 284-85.
140 The BEIR Report's discussion of cost-benefit analysis, "Needs of the Times,"
emphasizes direct comparison of nuclear power benefits in units of electridty produced
with risks to present citizens. BEIR REPORT, supra note 98, at 7-8. See Nash, Future

Generations and the Social Rate of Discount, 5 ENV'T & PLAN. 611 (1973).
141 See Fisher & Krutilla, Valuing Long-Run EcologicalConsequences andIrreversibilities,
in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION POLICY, supra note 86, at 280-82.

142 See note 83 supra. Some attempts have been made to quantify these values, but
the formulas are still conceptually weak. See Bishop & Cichetti, Some Institutionaland
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tance as the world becomes more crowded and interdependent.1 43 Fourth, the benefits from the avoidance of dynamic
externalities cannot be properly assessed. Some cumulative pollutants such as mercury and radioactive isotopes begin to exceed a linear relationship between dose and injury rates when
their concentrations in the environment rise above certain
levels for extended periods of time. 14 4 Uncertainty about the
threshold for ecological disaster and the magnitude of the
resulting damage wrongfully excludes these possibilities from
the cost-benefit analysis.145 In combination, these unknowns
increase the relative information costs of assessing benefits and
bias ALARA balancing tests in favor of minimal expenditure on
emission control devices.
The scope of the cost-benefit analysis also influences the
outcome of the balancing test. Although inclusion of cyclical
variables may provide a finer resolution of true regulatory costs
at a particular date, it produces a test whose results will vary
significantly from year to year. The ALARA principle requires
consideration of the impact of regulation upon socioeconomic
variables.' 46 In times that are economically unfavorable, NRC
standards for radiation discharge could be loosened, even
though the cost of technology remained the same. Whether or
not licensees actively manipulate the regulatory process, 147 the
continual variation in cost-benefit ratios would fail to ensure
any maximum level of radiation in the environment. Thus the
incorporation of economic conditions into the ALARA costbenefit analysis impedes progress toward the goal of greater
protection.
The imposition of a broad, even-weighted cost-benefit analysis on the decision to regulate radiation emissions places excessive emphasis upon documentation of specific health effects in
future years that can be quantified in dollars as benefits of
Conceptual Thoughts on the Measurement of Indirect and Intangible Benefits and Costs, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION POLICY,

critical discussion at 125-26.
143 See generally D. MEADOWS,

supra note 86, at 105-25, and

ET. AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH

(1972).

144 See Pearce, Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Guide to Environmental Policy, 29

KYKLos 97, 106 (1976).
145 Id. at 110.
146 See text accompanying note 92 supra.
147 See notes 125-132 supra and accompanying text.

1977]

Nuclear Power Plant Radiation

939

increased control. The practical limitations of similar computations of benefits in other areas have prompted analysts to criticize the use of cost-benefit tests for preliminary decisions. 4
Such decisions are inherently political, and intensities of preference on the compromise between present benefits and future
harms should be registered through a representative political
body.14 9 Congress should provide guidance to the NRC in
selecting an optimal standard of radiation exposure. In turn,
agency officials must devote more attention to the cost of complying with congressionally-prescribed standards.
C. Radiation Standards and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
The previous discussion indicated that present techniques
for choosing and implementing radiation emission controls fail
to protect the public adequately from the dangers of ionizing
radiation. To improve the regulatory process, Congress should
bring the NRC's procedure in line with the practice of
standard-setting for other pollutants.150 Legislative and administrative standards could ensure that some maximum exposure for both individuals and society as a whole would be
maintained. Moreover, if ongoing research indicates that lower
guidelines are desirable or that higher emissions would not
harm the public, standards could be adjusted over time without
extensive reevaluation and consequent delays. Agency personnel could redirect their efforts from the elusive valuation of
future benefits to the minimization of control costs for the
nuclear power industry.
Administrators would still need a decision rule to choose
among the various combinations of design requirements,
148 See L. MEREWITZ & S. SOSNICK, supra note 83, at 269.
149 Revelation of individual preferences for acceptable risk and desirable social
investment in effluent treatment through congressional representatives may produce a
better outcome than a well-designed and informed cost-benefit analysis because the
preferences reflect distributional effects of a proposal as well as efficiency effects. For a
discussion of the political alternative, see Portney, Voting, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Water
PollutionPolicy, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS & WATER POLLUTION POLICY, supra note 86,
at 293-311.
150 Air and water pollution control laws in the United States require emission
standards to be set initially by a congressional committee or an administrative agency.
The agency may require polluters to install the best available technology to meet the
emission standards. See Abel, Project-by-ProjectAnalysis vs. ComprehensivePlanning,in id.,
at 333.
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operating procedures, and siting criteria that could achieve
desired discharge levels for radioactive isotopes. Costeffectiveness analysis could provide a sophisticated and workable method for ranking these alternatives. This section will
discuss some of the advantages of cost-effectiveness analysis
and the potential obstacles that should be anticipated.
Cost-effectiveness analysis has long been used by public managers to evaluate and compare alternative means of achieving a
51
set objective.'
Cost-effectiveness analysis compares the cost of alternative
means for effectively achieving an agreed upon goal. The
means may be programs, technologies, devices or combinations of approaches. The goals are often expressed in terms
of public policy as laws and standards. 152 (emphasis added).
The application of cost-effectiveness analysis to nuclear power
plant regulation would occur after Congress set health boundary conditions for radiation exposure. Congress' stated health
objectives would reflect society's valuation of the health of present and future generations. Within this framework, the agency
could balance and compare the relative efficiency of various
control alternatives for each plant or source of radiation.
Substituting standards and cost-effectiveness analysis for
pre-regulatory cost-benefit analysis could improve the quality
of radiation risk management in several ways. One advantage
would be the elimination of the arbitrary calculation of benefits.
The benefits of stricter standards are difficult to quantify, but
15
there is good reason to believe they are understated.

3

Im-

plementation of cost-effectiveness analysis would eliminate the
need to assess health benefits from regulation. 1 54 A representative political decision would determine the desirable level of
health protection.

55

Cost-effectiveness analysis would also guard against piecemeal neutralization of radiation standards through regulatory
delay or changes in economic conditions. Regulatory agencies
151 See generally COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS (T. Goldman ed. 1967).
'152 B. O'NEILL & A. KELLEY, COSTS, BENEFITS, EFFECTIVENESS AND SAFETY: SET'TING

(Society of Automotive Engineers Rep. No. 740988, 1974).
153 See notes 103-107 supra and accompanying text.
154 See Luft, supra note 135, at 437 n.1.
155 See note 149 supra and accompanying text.
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could devote greater energy to development and enforcement
of the most cost-effective methods of meeting congressional
health standards. Fixed standards and analysis of control costs
would ensure that fragmented cost-benefit decisions for individual plants and the tactics of power plant licensees do not set
56
exposure levels above socially acceptable health risks.
In addition, cost-effectiveness analysis for fixed standards
should broaden the regulatory horizons of the NRC. The present emphasis on pre-regulatory cost-benefit analysis excludes
57
elements of regulation not directly related to the balance.1
Moreover, its complexity encourages agency circumvention of
the full requirements.1 58 But cost-effectiveness analysis requires consideration of feasible alternatives for attaining emission standards. 59 As a result, the NRC would have to incorporate backfitting of existing plants, siting analysis, and the effects
of reactor standardization into its administration of congressional health standards.
Finally, fixed standards and cost-effectiveness analysis could
advance the state of the art in control of radioactive power
plant discharges. Cost-benefit analysis is ill-designed to force
technological development. The test utilizes currently available
technology as its basis for control cost estimates. Furthermore,
the technical specifications of present equipment are the presumed boundary of industry's ability to purify its radioactive
emissions. The pre-regulatory cost-benefit analysis thus provides no inherent incentive for the development of new control
techniques. In its subservience to the concern that society
neither under- nor over-invest in radiation safety, the ALARA
cost-benefit test tends to entrench primitive technology.' 60
156 See notes 106-107, 127-130 supra and accompanying text.
157 See notes 108-115 supra and accompanying text.
158 See notes 116-124 supra and accompanying text.
159 See L. MEREWiTZ & S. SOSKIND, supra note 83, at 275.
160 The health effects in a traditional cost-benefit analysis can be conveniently
selected and valued at levels which will bring about a balance point always within the
realm of currently feasible control techniques. Those health effects which, if valued,
would bring about a new technique-forcing result (i.e., could lead to shutdown of a
plant) can be excluded from the analysis on various grounds. For example, the longterm global health effects of iodine, krypton and carbon-14 release if valued (and such
a valuation would always be necessarily somewhat arbitrary) would probably force
closing of most plants presently in operation until new cost-effective techniques become
available to lessen or prohibit their discharge. See, e.g., Petition by New England
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By contrast, the implementation of full cost-effectiveness
analysis through the imposition of boundary conditions for
human health could create objectives, inducements, and direction for further technological innovations in industry and government. The regulation of health hazards in this manner
should force advances in radiation control techniques and their
timely use on the part of regulated utilities. By setting health
objectives and then balancing costs and benefits subject to that
constraint, the NRC may set standards that are not presently
within the technological capabilities of licensees. Under threat
of shutdown, a utility would be disposed to make those investments in research and development necessary to meet the stan61

dards.1

Although the advantages of cost-effectiveness analysis within
fixed health standards are considerable, they can be achieved
only if Congress and the NRC understand and properly perform their functions. First, the NRC must promulgate emission
standards that meet congressional health objectives. It should
avoid the EPA's error of confusing cost-effectiveness analysis of
control techniques with cost-benefit analysis of regulatory alternatives. 162 Second, Congress and the agencies should not
Coalition on Nuclear Pollution for Amendment of S-3 Table of 10 C.F.R. § 50 (Nov. 19
and Dec. 18, 1975) (criticism of the NRC on krypton, tritium and carbon-14 evaluation
on file at Franklin Pierce Law Center, Concord, New Hampshire).
161 The effect should be similar to that promoted by strict liability in tort for
manufacturers of defective or inherently dangerous products. See Katz, The Function of
Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 587 (1969).
162 In the preamble to ProposedStandardsfor Radiationfor NuclearPower Operations,
the EPA described its analytical method as follows:
In developing the proposed standards, EPA has carefully considered, in addition to potential health effects, the available information on the effectiveness
and costs of various means of reducing radioactive effluents, and therefore
potential health effects, from fuel cycle operations. This consideration has
included the findings of the AEC and the NRC with respect to practicability of
effluent controls, as well as EPA's own continuing cognizance of the development, operating experience, and costs of control technology. Such an examination made it possible to propose the standards at levels consistent with the
capabilities of control technology and at a cost judged by the Agency to be
acceptable to society, as well as reasonable for the risk reduction achieved.
Thus the standards generally represent the lowest radiation levels at which the
Agency has determined that the costs of control are justified by the reduction
in health risks. The Agency has selected the cost-effectiveness approach as that
best designed to strike a balance between the need to reduce health risks to the
general population and the need for nuclear power. Such a balance is necessary in part because there is no sure way to guarantee absolute protection of
public health from the effects of a non-threshold pollutant, such as radiation,
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delegate their standard-setting authority to various "expert
groups" such as the International Commission on Radiological
Protection and the National Council on Radiation Protection. 163 Even though these advisory organizations may possess
more information about the health harms of radiation than
Congress or the NRC,164 they are essentially self-governing and
unaccountable to society. Vitally important decisions on upper
limits of radiation exposure would be insulated from public
scrutiny. Furthermore, the standards promulgated by these
private agencies are too narrowly focused on average human
exposure. They fail to provide guidance on acceptable levels of
radiation that could protect the environment and especially
susceptible groups such as children, fetuses, and power plant
employees.' 65 Congress and the NRC must make their own
determinations based upon the information they can accumu66
late and the preferences of their constituents.
other than by prohibiting outright any emissions. The Agency believes that

such a course would not be in the best interests of society.
Proposed Standards for Radiation Protection for Nuclear Power Operations, 40 Fed.
Reg. 23,420 (1975). In implementing the cost-effectiveness approach it outlines above,
the EPA should have chosen fixed objectives under which alternative control approaches could have been compared. No such fixed objectives or standards have been
publicly announced by the EPA, however, and the obvious conclusion is that the EPA's
cost-effectiveness approach to setting radiation standards has been conducted to
achieve the technical and economic feasibility parameters generated by the NRC.
163 See note 13 supra.
164 But experts also recognize the crudeness of their own data and estimates. See
BEIR REPORT, supra note 98, at 1.
165 See W. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 283-85.
166 Congressional activity in other forms of safety regulation reflects the belief that
Americans may desire more safety than an ordinary cost-benefit test would justify:
If... the principal benefits anticipated are the savings in lives and/or reductions in the frequency or severity of injuries which cannot be reasonably
quantified in monetary units, serious theoretical and conceptual difficulties
arise•.., Virtually all cost-benefit studies involving the loss of life or limb have
assigned fixed monetary values ... typically obtained either by computing the
discounted future income of individuals or by computing the discounted
differences between future earnings and personal consumption. These concepts and approaches have been criticized on a number of grounds ...
S. . National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has expressed
a similar view (a critical view). In its recent notice of proposed rule-making
concerning school bus crashworthiness, the agency stated that it "has conducted conventional cost-benefit studies on school bus safety, but the normal
valuation techniques evidently do not adequately reflect general public opinion on the importance of protecting children from death or injury. It is obvious
from the voluminous mail and Congressionalinterest that society places a higher value
on the safety of its children than a conventionalcost-benefit analysiswould indicate" ....
because of the major conceptual and methodological difficulties in the valua-
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Third, the NRC must assure itself access to reliable technical
information for cost-effectiveness analysis. Where control
techniques under consideration have already been utilized in
other sectors of industry or are otherwise available "off-theshelf" or from present production, government regulators
should have no difficulty obtaining accurate information on
performance and costs. Where the control techniques under
consideration are untested or in a developmental stage, however, information on reliability and costs is normally unavailable to government regulators unless the regulated industry
provides it. An industry seeking to avoid further regulation will
not be generous in providing such information. This deficiency
has been recognized in the context of regulatory decision concerning automobile safety.16 7 The nuclear power industry is the
primary source of information on the technical and cost features of proposed radiation control developments. Ongoing
agency review of the quality of industrial information and ongoing congressional oversight of the quality of the agency's
evaluations and use of such information is necessary to ensure
tion of life and limb, cost-benefit studies will be appropriate only in the
decision-making processes involving standards not primarily intended to save
lives and reduce injuries - that is ... standards to reduce property damage.
Congress recognized this distinction. Under Title I of the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (P.L. 92-513, 1972) - principally intended to reduce property damage losses resulting from low-speed crashes - it included a
mandatory requirenient for the Department of Transportation (DOT) to
consider both the costs and benefits... However, in considering the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, (P.L 89-563, 1966) which empowered
DOT to set motor vehicle safety standards aimed at reducing deaths and
injuries, Congress rejected draft language requiring such studies for safety
standards. (Hearings Before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S.H.Rep., 89th Congress, 2d Session, on HR 13228, "Part 2, Traffic
Safety", p. 1203).
B. O'NEILL & A. KELLEY, supra note 152, at 8.
167 The undependability of manufacturer-provided cost figures has been
exemplified often [examples cited].... [a] European auto manufacturer told
the General Accounting Office (GAO) of its belief that industry-generated cost
information is not useful for valid cost-effectiveness measurement. ".... the
auto industry," Volvo told GAO, "has in some instances taken advantage of the
lack of methodology and released biased material aimed purely at resisting
regulation."
In its report on "benefit-cost analyses"... GAO itself was critical... [of]
methods for collecting usable cost information involving standards, as well as
industry's reluctance to furnish such information.
U.S.

GEN. ACCT'G OFFICE, COMPTROLLER GEN. REP. No. B-164497(3), NEED TO IMPROVE
BENEFITr-CosT ANALYSES IN SETTING MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS 20-25 (July 22,

1974).
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that the results of cost-effectiveness analysis do not frustrate the
achievement of radiation exposure standards.
The implementation of cost-effectiveness analysis within the
constraints of external standards requires some care on the part
of Congress and regulatory agencies to avoid misinterpretation
and neglect of their responbilities. But the improved procedure
is worth the extra burden. Fixed standards and cost-effectiveness better reflect society's preferences for acceptable risks
from radiation exposure.
Conclusion

The concentration of regulatory power over nuclear facilities
in the hands of a single agency can explain many of its limitations. Because the EPA and the states have not been encouraged to set strong ambient radiation and siting standards, the
NRC's analysis of the environmental effects of effluent standhrds has been incomplete and its consideration of siting alternatives superficial. Because Congress has not undertaken the
responsibility of determining acceptable health risks from
radiation exposure, the NRC has been free to employ a balancing test that favors nuclear power development at the expense
of public health. To reverse these conditions, Congress must
give other bodies, including its own committees, a voice in the
siting, design, and operating requirements that nuclear power
plant licensees must satisfy.
Redistributing government responsibility for radiological
safety would not deprive the NRC or Congress of their share of
challenging tasks. The NRC would retain the difficult duty of
conducting cost-effectiveness investigations of current and
proposed technology to achieve congressional health objectives
at the lowest cost to the utilities. Congressional committees will
not find the job of articulating health objectives an easy one, but
its results could serve as a model to insure that regulation of
activities involving harmful externalities is accountable to public support for environmental health. Congress would also be
forced to recognize its role as guardian of future generations.
The price of inaction on a development project is an opportunity foregone; the price of inaction on nuclear power plant
radiation may be death and disfigurement for our descendants.
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